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DELIBERATE CLINICAL INERTIA  
Using meta-cognition to improve decision-making 
 
Abstract 
 
Deliberate clinical inertia is the art of doing nothing as a positive response. To 
be able to apply this concept, individual clinicians need to specifically focus on 
their clinical decision making. The skill of solving problems and making 
optimal clinical decisions requires more attention in medical training and 
should play a more prominent part of the medical curriculum.  This paper 
provides suggestions on how this may be achieved. Strategies to mitigate 
common biases are outlined, with an emphasis on reversing a ‘more is better’ 
culture towards more temperate, critical thinking. To incorporate such an 
approach in medical curricula and in clinical practice, institutional 
endorsement and support is required.  
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DELIBERATE CLINICAL INERTIA  
Using meta-cognition to improve decision-making 
 
Introduction  
This is the third and final instalment reflecting on our clinical practice and clinical 
decision making. In the first paper we coined the term ‘deliberate clinical inertia’ 
and provided suggestions on how to achieve a balance between under- and 
overdoing in clinical care. The second paper highlighted several clinical 
scenarios where deliberate clinical inertia could be implemented in our practice. 
We suggested approaches for common clinical scenarios that would improve 
patient outcomes and the clinician’s experience, as well as reduce healthcare 
cost. Using a case study, this last paper will focus on strategies for enhancing 
clinical reasoning and decision-making skills that foster deliberate clinical 
inertia. 
 
A case of lower limb cellulitis 
A 44-year-old accountant presents in the late afternoon to the emergency 
department (ED) with leg cellulitis. She was working in the garden a few days 
previously and sustained a scratch to her lower leg. It became red and tender 
and she decided to go to the ED since she could not get into the GP late in the 
day. Despite a low-grade fever (temperature 37.7°C), she is systemically well, 
with no rigors, nausea or vomiting. She is otherwise healthy, with no history of 
diabetes or immunocompromise. It is busy at triage and since it will be a few 
hours to be seen, a peripheral intravenous cannula (PIVC) is inserted (“just in 
case she needs intravenous antibiotics, plus she needs blood tests anyway, 
doesn’t she?”) and blood is sent for testing including a CRP. When the patient 
is assessed by the treating doctor, the working diagnosis of cellulitis is made. 
Since the patient has a PIVC in place, the decision is made to give 2 grams of 
intravenous flucloxacillin in the ED short stay ward (“She already has a cannula, 
right? – it is quite red and may be early sepsis, can’t hurt – can it?”). The treating 
doctor hands over the care to the short stay team, and since the patient turnover 
in short stay is high, the patient is not reviewed until after 10PM, where the 
decision is made that she may as well stay overnight for a few more intravenous 
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doses of antimicrobials. (“It is a probably a good idea, since the CRP was 
elevated at 43”). The next morning, the patient is still well without systemic 
features and she is discharged just before lunch with a prescription for oral 
flucloxacillin and a medical certificate for work, 18 hours after presenting. 
Cognitive bias and metacognition 
The case described is not unusual.  The human mind has the tendency to 
deal with problems in simple ways. It aims to minimise cognitive effort and 
avoid use of unnecessary mental bandwidth:  a phenomenon that has been 
called ‘the cognitive miser function’ by Fiske et al.1 In an ideal world this 
patient would not have had a PIVC inserted, not undergone certain blood 
tests, not received intravenous antibiotics, nor be required to have a 
prolonged overnight stay in ED and miss the next day at work. Individual 
clinicians need to be more aware of their decision making, and the skill of 
solving problems and making optimal clinical decisions requires more 
attention in medical training.  
 
At Dalhousie University Medical School (Halifax, Canada) a program in critical 
thinking was established in 2012 and from the start of medical training, 
students are exposed to the dominant model for decision making: Dual 
Process Theory,2 which consists of fast (Type 1 – intuitive decisions) and slow 
(Type 2 – analytical) processing. Although implemented as a ‘critical thinking’ 
program, the main impetus was to raise the profile of clinical reasoning and 
decision making in undergraduate and postgraduate medical training. The 
dominant theme of the program is rationality and how brain ‘mindware’3 is 
responsible for both the content and processing of information. Students are 
educated about factors that both inhibit rationality (lack of insight into the 
decision making process, cognitive and affective bias, cognitive miserliness, 
logical fallacies, failures to think scientifically and critically) as well as promote 
it (medical knowledge, critical thinking, metacognition, mindfulness, reflection, 
and bias mitigation strategies). Other important characteristics of the overall 
clinical assessment and management process are included such as ordering 
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and interpretation of tests, communication strategies, and shared decision 
making with the patient. 
 
Deliberate clinical inertia as part of the curriculum 
Thoughtful awareness and thinking about our thinking (meta-cognition) and 
actions are essential in changing clinician behaviour in a meaningful and 
sustainable way.  It requires ongoing engagement and dedicated effort of all 
relevant stakeholders, since so many behaviours are routine and ingrained.  
The current Australian Curriculum Framework for Junior Doctors4,5 has a 
heading ‘decision making’, which consists of three areas:  
• ‘Explain the indications, contraindications and risks for common 
procedures’ 
• ‘Select appropriate procedures with involvement of senior clinicians 
and the patient’ 
• ‘Consider personal limitations and ensures appropriate supervision’ 
Unfortunately, these statements do not clearly define the skills necessary for 
making wise decisions that take account of limited information and knowledge, 
and commonly encountered cognitive heuristics and biases. They also neglect 
the importance of emotions, the environmental pressures under which 
decisions must be made, and the need to communicate potential benefits and 
harms of future actions as part of shared decision making.  
The study and practice of clinical decision making should be a prominent part 
of the medical curriculum (which is possible as evidenced at Dalhousie), and 
specialty training programs can tailor the content to meet the needs of their 
particular specialty. Instilling a meta-cognitive perspective of reflection and self-
regulation into everyday practice will encourage every clinical decision to be 
actively thought through and lessen the risk of cognitive error arising from 
biased, intuitive (“Type 1”) decision making. This need not entail an exhaustive 
analytical approach to every decision a clinician makes, as Type 1 decision 
making, reliant on heuristics (mental short-cuts or rules of thumb), will usually 
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suffice. However, well-calibrated decision makers should always reserve the 
option to examine their Type 1 decisions deliberately and analytically (using 
“Type 2” processing) when the need is apparent.  How might these themes be 
accommodated within medical education? 
Firstly, our curricula (formal, informal, and hidden) and learner assessment 
methods need to be modified to emphasise reasoning. Ideally this includes the 
content of clinical problems and the context in which they occur, the existence 
of multiple diagnostic possibilities and treatment options, and the need to 
consider contextual factors and patient perspectives and values in arriving at 
final decisions.6,7  
Secondly, education must emphasise that uncertainty is the natural order. 
Doctors frequently make decisions on the basis of imperfect and incomplete 
data, which results in diagnostic and therapeutic uncertainty. Indeed, it is 
instructive to note that most doctors make patient-centered decisions every 
day without high-quality evidence, and that these decisions can be adjusted in 
response to developing insights or new information. Furthermore, foundational 
papers in evidence-based medicine (EBM) make it explicitly clear that EBM 
never intended to exclude information derived from experience and intuition.8 
Diagnosis is also a dynamic process, and delay in diagnosis is part of the 
natural course of many conditions. This natural diagnostic process leaves 
clinicians often with multiple reasonable and defensible investigation and 
management decisions of which the outcomes cannot always be predicted 
with confidence. The interplay of patient preferences, societal values, 
logistical constraints, and resource availability adds to the complexity. 
Developing and maintaining a tolerance for uncertainty, curiosity about the 
unknown, and skills in managing uncertainty are keys to becoming (and 
remaining) a resilient, effective clinician.  Actively promoting discussions that 
embrace the grey zones of medicine (areas lacking definitive evidence to 
guide clinical actions) and developing students’ (and clinicians’) ability to 
explicitly acknowledge and be comfortable with uncertainty must be an 
essential part of contemporary medical curricula.6 
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Thirdly, there must be open exploration of how reasoning may falter. One 
method for increasing awareness and understanding of one’s own thought 
process (meta-cognition) is to engage in cognitive huddles (or “time out”)9 
whereby students and experienced clinicians discuss perplexing or difficult 
cases and disclose actual or potential missteps in decision making related to 
both cognitive (internal) and non-cognitive (external) factors. Recounting and 
thinking through a reasoning error with students and doctors (of any seniority) 
enhances everyone’s learning and ability to explore their own thought 
processes more deeply within a psychologically safe environment. Such an 
exercise also empowers clinicians to ask their seniors or peers to explain the 
reasoning behind their decisions and, in appropriate circumstances, 
encourage deliberate clinical inertia.10,11 
  
Fourthly, the commonly encountered biases in decision-making must be 
exposed and strategies for countering them emphasised. Our case study 
exemplifies several of them. A list of common biases and descriptors are 
summarised in Table 1, with more described elsewhere.9,12,13 Misdiagnosis or 
delayed diagnosis of serious conditions loom large as matters of concern for 
both patient and clinician. Several bias mitigating strategies (see Table 2), if 
explicitly taught and regularly practised, may render clinicians less vulnerable 
to erroneous decisions resulting from biased reasoning. These strategies can 
be focused on both diagnostic and treatment processes.  
 
In the case study, the possibility of cellulitis becoming severe sepsis (“Don’t’ 
chase zebras” – Table 2, row 2)12 if the patient was not treated aggressively 
with intravenous antibiotics and monitored in hospital were key drivers of 
clinical actions. Omission regret is a strong motivator for clinicians to do things 
rather than stand still and think more deeply.14 Clinicians worry more about 
seeing a patient suffer a bad but unlikely outcome they might have been able 
to prevent by doing something (“tolerating uncertainty”)6. They worry less 
about the negative consequences of giving an unnecessary treatment to 
many more people who stand to gain no benefit. What may help in such 
situations is for clinicians to gain confidence in thinking more probabilistically 
(by balancing the likelihood of the diagnosis they fear most versus estimating 
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and noting the likelihood of the diagnosis most favoured given all the clinical 
features in the medical record– “probabilistic notation’)15 and acting 
expectantly by treating the condition most favoured and reassess as 
circumstances evolve (“slow diagnosis”)16. In the case study, uncomplicated 
mild cellulitis in a young immunocompetent patient is the most likely diagnosis 
based on clinical presentation and can be treated expectantly with oral 
antibiotics (“stepped care”)9,17 and advice to the patient to return if the 
condition worsens, with explicit time-specific and action-specific instructions 
(“safety netting”).9,18,19  
 
The other features of the case are the diagnostic momentum,12 framing effect12 
and groupthink which fed into the ensuing cascade of overtreatment 
administered by a sequence of different clinicians. The hypothesis of sepsis 
was not challenged, the patient was framed as someone who needed inpatient 
care by virtue of having a PIVC inserted with intravenous antibiotics and blood 
tests, and groupthink meant that no-one prioritised the patient as being eligible 
for early reassessment and expedited discharge, and no-one altered their work 
flow accordingly.            
 
Finally, we must acknowledge that clinicians, like all humans, are influenced by 
peer opinions and social norms. The ethicist John Banja describes ‘the 
normalisation of deviance’ as the large-scale acceptance and tacit 
endorsement of violations of recognised standards of practice as a factor 
contributing to preventable patient harm.20 This ‘normalisation of deviance’ 
could contribute to the over-testing and over-treatment that has been described 
over the last 20 years. For example, in the last decade, the proportion of 
patients with suspected renal colic who undergo CT scans of the kidneys, 
ureters and bladder has progressively increased from 25% to 75%.21 If this 
increase had occurred rapidly, clinicians would interpret it as an unwarranted 
variation from standard practice, but as it has occurred gradually it has become 
accepted as not only normal but as standard practice. Greater recognition of 
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indication creep for both tests and treatments may provide an opportunity to 
recalibrate what the average clinician regards as normal.  
 
Reversing this ‘more is better’ culture towards more temperate, critical 
thinking will need professional endorsement, especially by influential senior 
opinion leaders, good role models, and institutional support. Changing 
behaviour of groups of clinicians and whole organisations is challenging to 
enact and to measure, especially with regards to quantity and quality of 
clinical decision making. The professionally-led Choosing Wisely initiative,22 
which was launched to improve stewardship of resource use by pinpointing 
areas of low-value care, has made limited inroads in most of the areas that 
have been investigated in the United States to date.23 Achieving cultural 
change is further complicated if new initiatives impact on other performance 
indicators, such as compliance with established guidelines. This especially 
relevant for guidelines which pursue a more aggressive approach to care, 
including recommendations for multiple interventions, and fail to detail clinical 
circumstances where recommendations may not be applicable. Patients 
require nuanced decisions and there must be room for practice variation, 
based upon special patient characteristics, and shared decision making. 
Institutions such as hospitals, governments, and universities need to support 
judicious, patient-centred deviation from recommendations in guidelines that 
are based on low level evidence. To engage and empower clinicians, 
guideline panels might consider reasons for such deviations in guideline 
development or updates. 
In conclusion, in busy everyday practice, our heuristics and habits save 
cognitive effort compared to more analytical thinking. However, clinicians need 
to retain situational awareness and actively consider alternative ideas that may 
go against the ‘flow’.  Developing skills in dealing concurrently with ambiguity, 
competing diagnostic or management options, harm-benefit trade-offs, system 
of care exigencies and social pressures is paramount in developing deliberate 
clinical inertia. This will require explicit training in both undergraduate and 
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postgraduate curricula, and change leadership from senior clinicians, 
organisational leaders and guideline developers. 
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Table 1 – Common cognitive biases12  
Bias Description 
Anchoring and 
adjustment 
Anchoring is the tendency to fixate on specific features of a 
presentation too early in the diagnostic process, and to base the 
likelihood of a particular event on information available at the 
outset (i.e., this person may have early sepsis). This can be an 
effective strategy. However, this initial impression exerts an overly 
powerful effect in some people and they fail to adjust it sufficiently 
in the light of later, potentially disconfirming information.  
Ascertainment Ascertainment bias occurs when the physician’s thinking is pre-
shaped by expectations by what the physician specifically expects 
to find. A physician is more likely to find evidence of congestive 
heart failure in a patient who relates that he or she has recently 
been noncompliant with his or her diuretic medication. Stereotyping 
and gender biases are examples of ascertainment bias 
Availability Availability is the tendency for things to be judged more frequent if 
they come readily to mind. Things that are common will be readily 
recalled. The heuristic is driven by the assumption that the 
evidence that is most available is the most relevant. Thus, if an 
emergency physician previously saw a patient with cellulitis that led 
to septic shock (and an ICU admission), there will be a greater 
tendency to bring sepsis to mind when the next patient with 
cellulitis presents.  
Confirmation When a hypothesis is developed on relatively weak or ambiguous 
data, it may later interfere with superior and more plentiful data. 
Such subsequent data might not be treated objectively and may be 
ignored. Confirmation bias is reflected in a tendency to look for 
confirming evidence to support the hypothesis, rather than look for 
disconfirming evidence to refute it. (“Putting a square peg in a 
round hole”) 
Diagnosis 
momentum 
Diagnosis momentum refers to the tendency for a particular 
diagnosis to become established without adequate evidence. 
Typically, the process starts with an opinion, not necessarily a 
medical one, of what the source of the patient’s symptoms might 
be. As this is passed from person to person, the diagnosis gathers 
momentum to the point that it may appear almost certain by the 
time the patient sees a physician. Attaching a diagnostic label is a 
convenient short-hand way of communicating. It invariably means 
that someone else’s thinking has been inherited. Further dangers 
imposed by this process are that it may result in further delays or 
misdirection at ED triage. Physicians should always be wary when 
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a patient begins the exchange by volunteering his or her own 
diagnosis. 
Framing Framing occurs when equivalent descriptions of a scenario lead to 
systematically different decisions depending on how they are 
phrased. In our example people react differently to a patient with 
‘possible sepsis’ compared to ‘a young healthy person with 
cellulitis’. 
Overconfidence We usually think we know more than we do, often without having 
gathered sufficient information, and generally place too much faith 
in our own opinions. Those who are overconfident tend to spend 
insufficient time accumulating evidence and synthesizing it before 
action. They are more inclined to act on incomplete information and 
hunches. When overconfident people believe that their involvement 
might have a significant impact on outcomes (whether it actually 
does or not), they tend to believe strongly that the outcome will be 
positive. Thus, they disproportionately value their contribution.  
Premature closure Physicians typically generate several diagnoses early in their 
encounter with a clinical problem. Premature closure occurs when 
one of these diagnoses is accepted before it has been fully verified. 
Attaching a diagnosis to a patient provides a convenient, short-
hand description. It may also reflect some laziness of thought and 
a desire to achieve completion, especially when fatigued. 
Representativeness The patient’s signs and symptoms are matched against the 
physician’s mental templates for their representativeness. Thus, we 
often base our decision about whether or not something belongs to 
a particular category by how well it matches the characteristics of 
members of that category. The prototype is the most representative 
member of the class. Traditionally medical education has taught 
about prototype recognition. Thus, medical students are generally 
more concerned with being able to list all the signs and symptoms 
of unstable angina than list those ‘‘atypical’’ patients in whom the 
diagnosis is occasionally missed. However, if we develop an 
overreliance on the heuristic, we tend to misidentify atypical 
variants of a category.  
Search Satisficing Search satisficing is the tendency to call off a search once 
something is found. However, in the ED searching contingencies 
are fundamentally different. There is often more than one thing to 
be found, we are not always sure what it looks like, we do not 
always know where to look, and we often do not find anything. In 
many cases, satisfying oneself that the search is over once 
something has been found will be erroneous (2nd fracture, co-
ingestion, 2nd diagnosis).  
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Table 2.  
Cognitive bias mitigation strategies for clinical decision-making in the following 
domains: i) Diagnostic and ii) Treatment/ Management at both individual and 
organisational level 
 
Strategy Description 
 
DIAGNOSTIC 
Tolerating 
uncertainty 
Understand situations where chasing complete or near certainty with 
further investigations or trials of treatment is unnecessary and unlikely 
to change management and may even distract from the main aim. 
Seeking certainty may cause one to chase up blind alleys.6  
Don’t chase 
zebras 
Ask “what is the most likely diagnosis” and “what one diagnosis 
shouldn’t I miss?”, with these in mind, use a parsimonious approach to 
test ordering. This places a focus on estimating pre-test probability, 
thinking in a Bayesian manner and applying the aphorism of Occam’s 
razor.12 
Probabilistic 
notation 
When documenting a diagnosis, clarify the level of confidence in this 
diagnosis based on your assessment of its probability (likely/definite 
diagnosis >75%, working diagnosis 50-75%, uncertain but no other 
diagnosis 10-50%, unlikely <10% but needs ruling out because of 
critical impact)15 
Time out Defer making a decision in non-urgent situations and take time to re-
think and research the problem when removed from workday pressures. 
This technique is relevant to both awareness of knowledge deficits and 
awareness of cognitive processing limitations, including fatigue.9 
Safety netting A way of not committing to immediate action but advising the patient of 
circumstances under which actions should occur.18 The term was 
introduced to general practice by Roger Neighbour19 who defined 
safety-netting as encompassing three questions: (1) If I'm right what do I 
expect to happen? (2) How will I know if I'm wrong? (3) What would I do 
then? Can be used for both diagnostic and treatment uncertainties. 
Tincture of 
time 
Since many conditions are self-remitting, or the indications for 
intervention become clearer with time, the “tincture of time”25 can be 
used as an alternative to zebra hunting, test cascades and immediate 
instigation of treatments. Requires good skills in safety netting. 
Slow 
diagnosis 
Do not rush to a diagnosis in one consultation and instead focus on the 
problem and avoid premature use of labels which may not be needed.16 
 
TREATMENT / MANAGEMENT – individual level 
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Shared 
decision 
making 
Patients and their clinicians reach agreement about goals of care. 
Shared decision making is important in many scenarios where there is i) 
clinical uncertainty or equipoise and ii) patient ability to make decisions. 
An overarching goal is to avoid future (inappropriate) care, especially 
invasive care.26 
Stepped care Many initial assessments (outlier abnormalities of clinical or 
physiological signs) will often return to normal, either due to the 
intervention or because of the natural course of the condition. An 
example of stepped care9,17 is the initial prescription of analgesia for 
uncomplicated childhood otitis media according to symptoms, with 
delayed prescribing of antibiotics. This less intense, evidence-based 
approach achieves the desired objective without wasting resources or 
posing risk of harm. 
De-
intensification 
Reducing the intensity of tests and treatments are considered 
appropriate options if less invasive or less costly options are sufficient in 
achieving specific diagnostic or therapeutic objectives while lessening 
the risk of adverse events and reducing burden, costs and 
inconvenience for patients.27 
 
TREATMENT / MANAGEMENT – organisational/team level 
Nudge 
strategies 
Directing (or nudging) clinicians away from overuse by various means 
such as publicly declared compacts or default settings in computerised 
ordering and prescribing systems, none of which deny clinicians 
the choice of taking alternative actions.28 
Instantiation 
of suboptimal 
care 
Use of patient narratives and case studies that illustrate (or instantiate) 
how overuse can cause physical, mental and emotional harm or impose 
inconvenience and avoidable costs.29 
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